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KYLLO V. UNITED STATES AND THE PARTIAL 
ASCENDANCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S  
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RICHARD H. SEAMON
*
 
 Ways may some day be developed by which the Government . . . 
will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of 
the home.—Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent terrorist attacks on the United States will inspire a call for 
intrusive, new surveillance technology.
1
 When used by the government, this 
technology strains the Fourth Amendment.
2
 That is because the technology 
 
 
 * Visiting Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; Associate Professor of Law, 
University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that, as an 
Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States from 1990-1996, I was involved in several lower 
court cases involving the issue that was before the Court in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 
(2001), and represented the United States before the Court in two of the cases discussed in this Article, 
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 
(1993). The views expressed in this Article are, of course, mine alone.  
 1. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha & Jonathan Krim, Privacy, Security Trade-Offs Reassessed: 
Objections to Surveillance Technology Face New Test After Attack, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at E1 
(“Just two days after the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, some people are reassessing the trade-offs 
between privacy and security.”).  
 2. The Fourth Amendment says:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although the Fourth Amendment itself governs only searches and seizures by 
the federal government, it applies to the States because it is incorporated into the Due Process Clause 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
1014 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:1013 
 
 
 
 
often can enable the government to gather information in ways that are hard 
to analyze under a provision that seems to address physical interferences with 
tangible things (i.e., “searches” and “seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects”).3 Illustrating the strain, the government’s use of an electronic 
listening device prompted the United States Supreme Court to modify the 
definition of a Fourth Amendment “search” in the landmark case of Katz v. 
United States.
4
 Recently, the Court again confronted the question of whether 
government surveillance technology constituted a “search” in Kyllo v. United 
States.
5
 The thesis of this Article is that Kyllo reflects a significant, though 
subtle, departure from Katz, for which Justice Scalia is primarily responsible.  
 The facts of Kyllo provide a good metaphor for the Court’s decision in 
that case. In Kyllo, a federal law enforcement agent aimed a thermal imager 
at the outside of Danny Kyllo’s house.6 On the surface, Kyllo’s house was 
probably as unremarkable as his neighbors’ houses. By comparing the heat 
radiating from the surface of his house to that radiating from his neighbors’ 
houses, however, the agent determined that something unusual—indeed 
illegal—was going on inside.7  
The Court’s decision in Kyllo, like Kyllo’s house, appears unremarkable 
on the surface. The Court in Kyllo held by a 5-to-4 vote that the thermal 
imaging of Kyllo’s house constituted a “search” within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.
8
 Although the vote was close, and the voting alignment 
was unusual, the majority as well as the dissent claimed merely to be 
applying the well-established test announced in Katz, under which 
government conduct constitutes a search when it interferes with an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.9 The Kyllo majority and 
dissent seemed to disagree primarily on how to apply the Katz test to 
surveillance technology that makes measurements “off the wall” but does not 
penetrate “through the wall,” of a house.10 This point of dispute centered on a 
                                                                                                                         
 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as one of the “libert[ies]” protected by that Clause. See Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).  
 3. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 288, 291-300 (2001) (describing a variety of sophisticated surveillance technology). 
 4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (3d ed. 1996) (calling Katz a “landmark” case). 
 5. 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001). 
 6. Id. at 2041.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 2046.  
 9. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the “Katz test . . . has come to mean the test enunciated by 
Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) 
(applying “two-part inquiry” of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz).  
 10. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 (discussing dissent’s argument that “off the wall” technology 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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narrow distinction that the Court’s post-Katz case law did not unequivocally 
resolve.  
Despite superficial appearances, when you compare the doctrinal 
emanations from the Kyllo decision with those from the Court’s other recent 
Fourth Amendment decisions, you can see two significant shifts. First, Kyllo 
shows that a majority of the Court shares Justice Scalia’s doubt about the 
usefulness of the Katz test. Second, Kyllo reinforces the Court’s tendency in 
the last ten years to narrow the class of cases in which warrantless searches 
are treated as presumptively unconstitutional. In these two ways, Kyllo 
reflects an ascendance of Justice Scalia’s view of the Fourth Amendment. 
This ascendance is only partial, however. Although the Kyllo majority 
avoided the Katz test because the application of that test would undermine 
home privacy, the Court did not expressly repudiate Katz. Moreover, the 
Kyllo majority did not replace the Katz test with the original-understanding 
approach that Justice Scalia advocates. Furthermore, although Kyllo 
reinforces the narrow warrant presumption that Justice Scalia favors, the 
Court does not seem ready to adopt Justice Scalia’s view that the common 
law is the primary determinant of when the Fourth Amendment requires 
search warrants.  
This Article examines Kyllo in four steps. Part I briefly describes the facts 
and procedural history of the case. Part II examines the facets of the majority 
and dissenting opinions that will receive the most attention from lower courts 
and practitioners. Part III examines Kyllo beneath the surface to demonstrate 
its doctrinal importance.  
I. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF KYLLO 
Just as the government’s war on alcohol fueled new methods of 
surveillance during Prohibition,
11
 so has the government’s war on drugs since 
the 1980s.
12
 Kyllo reflects a small skirmish in the latter war, in which the 
government attempted to achieve victory by using one form of technology to 
                                                                                                                         
 
should be treated differently from “through the wall” technology). See also infra notes 39-51 and 
accompanying text (contrasting the approaches of the dissent and majority to the technology in 
question).  
 11. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-57 (1928) (wiretaps used to gather 
evidence of violations of the National Prohibition Act).  
 12. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1989) (plurality opinion) (police used 
helicopters hovering at 400-foot altitude to see marijuana growing in backyard); United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 708-10 (1984) (law-enforcement agents attached electronic beepers to cans of ether to 
track suspected drug traffickers). See also Peter Joseph Bober, The “Chemical Signature” of the 
Fourth Amendment: Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry and the War on Drugs, 8 SETON HALL 
CONST. L.J. 75, 76-82 (1997) (describing use of chemical testing in war on drugs).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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detect another form.
13
 
Some people use high-intensity lamps to grow African violets; Danny 
Kyllo used them to grow marijuana.
14
 Suspecting as much, a federal agent 
parked across the street from Kyllo’s home in Florence, Oregon, late one 
night in 1992 and scanned it with a thermal imager.
15
 As described by the 
Court, a thermal imager “detect[s] infrared radiation [and] . . . . converts the 
radiation into [visual] images based on relative warmth.”16 The thermal 
imager used on Kyllo’s house indicated that the roof over his garage and a 
side wall of his house were hot compared to the surfaces of the neighboring 
homes.
17
 Based on this information and other evidence, including Kyllo’s 
utility bills, federal agents obtained a warrant to search Kyllo’s house.18 The 
search revealed an indoor marijuana-growing operation with more than 100 
plants.
19
  
Kyllo was prosecuted for the federal crime of manufacturing marijuana.
20
 
He moved to suppress from his prosecution the evidence found in the search 
of his home.
21
 He argued that the evidence was seized under a warrant that 
rested on information gathered in an unconstitutional search—namely, the 
warrantless thermal imaging of his house.
22
 This argument posed the 
question whether the use of the thermal imager was a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
23
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the government’s use 
of a thermal imager on Kyllo’s house was not a search.24 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this holding,
25
 even though the 
 
 
 13. The government was victorious in the sense that it discovered Kyllo committing a crime. By 
the time the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the government had unreasonably searched Kyllo’s 
house in the process of discovering his crime, Kyllo had served one month in jail. Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Rule out High-Tech Probe, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE, June 12, 2001, at A8 (reporting that Kyllo 
had spent one month in jail as of time of Court’s decision).  
 14. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. (stating that Kyllo was indicted on one count of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).  
 21. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.  
 22. See id.  
 23. See id. After the trial court denied Kyllo’s suppression motion, he entered a conditional 
guilty plea, preserving the Fourth Amendment issue for appeal.  
 24. Id. See also Kyllo v. United States, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998) (original panel opinion, 
later withdrawn); Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (later panel opinion approving 
the search).  
 25. 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (order granting certiorari).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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Ninth Circuit’s decision did not conflict with that of any other federal courts 
of appeals.
26
 
II. KYLLO ON THE SURFACE 
On the surface, Kyllo does not break much new ground or reflect any 
deep division on the Court. In holding that the government’s thermal imaging 
of a private home constituted a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, a 
five-member majority announced a rule that, they claimed, was derived from 
the well-settled Katz test and that indeed accords with the result in Katz.
27
 
The four-member dissent ostensibly disagreed with the majority only on how 
to apply the Katz test to surveillance technology that operates by taking 
measurements “off the walls” of a house, rather than penetrating “through the 
walls.”28 The disagreement thus seemed to center on a particular feature of 
the technology at issue, with the majority favoring a result that better 
protected home privacy. 
The voting alignment was odd, as many commentators observed.
29
 Justice 
Scalia wrote for a majority—consisting also of Justices Souter, Thomas, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer—that reached a result favoring a criminal defendant.30 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissent that endorsed the government’s position and 
that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy.
31
 Contrary to the impression conveyed by the popular press, this 
alignment was not unprecedented.
32
 Justice Scalia had voted to uphold 
 
 
 26. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2049 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that all federal courts of 
appeals to decide the issue had held that thermal imaging of a home is not a search, except for one 
Tenth Circuit decision that had been vacated and decided on other grounds); Brief in Opposition at 7-
8, Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001) (No. 99-8508).  
 27. 121 S. Ct. at 2046.  
 28. Id. at 2052.  
 29. See, e.g., David Cole, Scalia’s Kind of Privacy, THE NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6, available at 
2001 WL 2132778 (characterizing Kyllo as “[o]ne of the most surprising decisions” of the Term with 
Justice Scalia “ruling in favor of a criminal defendant . . . . In the most unlikely collaboration of the 
year.”); Linda Greenhouse, Privacy Is Winner Against Technology in Court’s Ruling, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, June 18, 2001, at 6A, available at 2001 WL 9362604 (noting that Kyllo “was not the usual 
5-4, conservative-liberal split”); Jennifer Liebman & Anne Stopper, Supreme Court Review: The 
Biggest Cases of the Term, LEGAL TIMES, July 2, 2001, at 12 (noting the “odd alliance” composing the 
majority in Kyllo); Jeffrey Rosen, A Victory for Privacy, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2001, at A18 
(observing that Justice Scalia “is not ordinarily celebrated by liberals for his devotion to the right to 
privacy,” which made his decision for majority in Kyllo notable); Eric J. Sinrod, Supreme Court Looks 
at a Hot Privacy Issue, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 2001, at 5 (stating that Kyllo surprisingly pits Justice 
Antonin Scalia on the side of individual privacy rights and Justice John Paul Stevens on the side of law 
enforcement” and that “[t]he grouping of the dissenting justices reveals some strange bedfellows”).  
 30. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046-47.  
 31. See id. at  2047.  
 32. See supra note 29 (citing press commentary on Kyllo).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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individual privacy interests over government interests in prior Fourth 
Amendment cases,
33
 and Justice Stevens had voted in favor of the 
government in prior Fourth Amendment cases.
34
 Even so, the unusual voting 
alignment in Kyllo suggested that something unusual was taking place. 
Perhaps partly to counteract suggestions that the Court was breaking 
significant new ground, the majority’s opinion depicted the case as requiring 
only a “refinement” of precedent in light of new technology.35 The majority 
admitted that the Court has had trouble identifying “searches” under the Katz 
test.
36
 The majority assured us, however, that, “[w]hile it may be difficult to 
refine Katz” for use in contexts outside of the home, no such difficulty 
existed “in the case of the search of the interior of a home.”37 In that setting, 
the Court explained: “[T]here is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the 
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists and that is 
acknowledged to be reasonable.”38 To preserve this “individual” expectation, 
the majority announced a rule: “[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.”39 This rule, the majority promised, 
 
 
 33. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 307, 313-23 (1997) (opinion joined by Justice 
Scalia holding that Georgia drug-testing program for certain candidates for public office violated the 
Fourth Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-87 (1989) 
(Justice Scalia dissenting, in opinion joined by Justice Stevens, from decision upholding warrantless 
drug-testing of certain railroad employees); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323-29 (1987) (majority 
opinion by Justice Scalia holding that police’s cursory inspection of stereo equipment suspected to be 
stolen violated the Fourth Amendment).  
 34. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387-95 (1997) (holding, in opinion written 
for majority by Justice Stevens, that police officer’s “no knock” entry into hotel room did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130-41 (1990) (holding, in opinion 
written for majority by Justice Stevens, that “plain view” doctrine did not require police to come 
across seized evidence inadvertently); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 80-89 (1987) (holding, in 
opinion written for majority by Justice Stevens, that police did not violate Fourth Amendment when 
they searched apartment separate from the one for which warrant authorized a search).  
 35. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043 (purporting to “refine” Katz test for use in cases involving “the 
search of interior of homes”). But see infra Part III.A (arguing that, instead of refining Katz test, Kyllo 
actually departs from Katz test).  
 36. See id. (“The Katz test—whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and 
unpredictable.”).  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
 39. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also id. at 2046 (“Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”); id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing 
sentence quoted in text accompanying this note as “a rule that is intended to provide essential 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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would ensure “preservation of that degree of privacy against government that 
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
40
 Couched as a 
“refine[ment]” of Katz with “roots deep in the common law,” the majority’s 
rule sounds familiar and reassuring. 
The majority cited Katz not only in framing its rule of decision, but also 
in refuting the dissent’s “leading point.”41 The dissent’s leading point was 
that thermal imaging detects “only heat radiating from the external surface of 
the house.”42 The dissent reasoned that, because the heat is exposed to the 
public, its measurement cannot interfere with any reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the Katz test.
43
 The majority countered that, under this 
reasoning, the result in Katz was wrong. Katz held that a search occurred 
when the government used an “eavesdropping device [that] picked up only 
sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth.”44 The thermal 
imager likewise measured only heat waves that reached the exterior of 
Kyllo’s house. The Kyllo majority admitted that the thermal imager “was 
relatively crude,” but the majority explained, “[T]he rule we adopt must take 
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”45 This explanation suggests the majority is not just abiding by 
Katz, but extending it. 
The dissent in Kyllo, like the majority, depicted the difference between it 
and the majority as a narrow dispute about the proper application of the Katz 
test. The dissent relied primarily on Katz’s statement that “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”46 The dissent observed that, in 
cases after Katz, the Court had relied on this principle to hold that no Fourth 
Amendment search occurred when the government rummaged through a bag 
of trash that a homeowner left on the sidewalk; when the government 
conducted aerial surveillance of someone’s backyard; or when the 
government observed smoke emanating from a chimney.
47
 In these cases, the 
                                                                                                                         
 
guidance” for future, more sophisticated forms of surveillance technology).  
 40. Id. at 2043.  
 41. Id. at 2044.  
 42. Id. at 2044 (quoting Brief for the United States at 26).  
 43. See id. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a 
kitchen, or a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building. A 
subjective expectation that they would remain private is not only implausible but also surely not ‘one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).  
 44. Id. at 2044.  
 45. Id.   
 46. Id. at 2047 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 351)).  
 47. See id. at 2047 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dissent discerned “a distinction of constitutional magnitude between 
‘through-the-wall surveillance’ that gives the observer or listener direct 
access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the thought 
processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain, on 
the other hand.”48 The dissent accordingly would not treat surveillance 
technology as a search “unless it provide[d] its user with the functional 
equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched.”49 Under this 
standard, the dissent considered thermal imaging to be outside the Fourth 
Amendment because it operated in a passive way and the information it 
gathered was too crude.
50
 Other than excluding thermal imaging from Fourth 
Amendment protection, however, the dissent’s test did not seem much 
different from that of the majority.
51
 
To judges and practitioners who will confront Kyllo in the future, the 
decision will likely appear to involve only legal line-drawing about which 
reasonable minds differed.
52
 The majority and dissent each apparently and 
plausibly understood the Katz test to require Fourth Amendment scrutiny of 
government surveillance methods that are comparable to physical intrusions 
into the home. The majority and dissent differed only on whether thermal 
imaging was enough like a physical intrusion to trigger the Fourth 
Amendment. The difference between the majority and the dissent seems to 
matter mainly for passive detection devices like thermal imagers. Future 
litigation in lower courts will probably focus on the meaning, rather than the 
derivation, of the majority’s rule.53 
 
 
 48. Id. at 2047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 49. Id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 50. See id. at 2048 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As still images from the infrared scans show . . . no 
details regarding the interior of petitioner’s home were revealed. Unlike an x-ray scan, or other 
possible ‘through the wall’ techniques, the detection of infrared radiation emanating from the home did 
not accomplish ‘an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises’ . . . .”) (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961)); id. at 2049 (“Since what was involved in this case was 
nothing more than drawing inferences from off-the-wall surveillance, rather than any ‘through-the-
wall’ surveillance, the officers’ conduct did not amount to a search and was perfectly reasonable.”).  
 51. See id. at 2046 (“The dissent’s proposed standard—whether the technology offers the 
‘functional equivalent of actual presence in the area being searched’—would seem quite similar to our 
own at first blush.”) (citation omitted); id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that majority’s 
“rule” is “intended to provide essential guidance for the day when more sophisticated systems gain the 
ability to see through walls and other opaque barriers”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 52. See, e.g., David Cole, supra note 29, at 6 (calling Kyllo “a close case, as Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s quite reasonable dissent shows”).  
 53. As the Kyllo dissent observed, the majority’s rule can be broken down into four elements, 
each of which will no doubt raise future questions. See 121 S. Ct. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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III. KYLLO BENEATH THE SURFACE 
Beneath its surface, Kyllo is important because it vindicates Justice 
Scalia’s view of the Fourth Amendment in two ways. First, Kyllo endorses 
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Katz test. Second, Kyllo continues the Court’s 
trend of narrowing the class of cases in which warrantless searches are 
presumptively invalid. Although these developments do not totally vindicate 
Justice Scalia’s view of the Fourth Amendment, they produce a Fourth 
Amendment that differs dramatically from the one that existed when he 
joined the Court. 
A. Kyllo and Katz 
Although the Kyllo majority purported to “refine” the Katz test, the 
majority actually departed from that test.
54
 The majority did so to avoid a 
problem with the test that Justice Scalia identified in prior opinions which did 
not command a majority. The departure does not, however, reflect a 
complete victory for Justice Scalia. For one thing, this departure only occurs 
in a limited context (i.e., when use of the Katz test would undermine 
privacy). Moreover, the Kyllo majority did not adopt the analysis that Justice 
Scalia would use instead of the Katz test. 
1. The Extent to Which Kyllo Endorses Justice Scalia’s Fourth 
Amendment 
The Katz test “has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice Harlan’s 
separate concurrence in Katz.”55 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan said that 
government conduct is a search when it interferes with an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
56
 Under that test, the government 
conducted a search when it used a microphone attached to the outside of a 
phone booth to hear Katz’s end of a telephone conversation; it did not matter 
that this surveillance method did not require physical invasion of any private 
space.
57
 Thus in Katz, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard 
 
 
 54. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043 (remarking on the difficulty of “refin[ing]” Katz for use in other 
contexts, but finding no such difficulty in context of search of interior of home).  
 55. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). See, e.g., California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (applying “two-part inquiry” of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz).  
 56. 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (reading the majority’s opinion, as well as Court’s 
precedent, to establish that “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy”).  
 57. See id. at 353 (“The fact that the electronic device employed . . . did not happen to penetrate 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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replaced a standard that initially “was tied to common-law trespass”58 and 
that, at the time of Katz, still seemed to require physical penetration into a 
constitutionally protected area.
59
 
Justice Scalia criticized the Katz test for three reasons in a concurring 
opinion, which was joined only by Justice Thomas, in Minnesota v. Carter.
60
 
First, he said, the test “has no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment.”61 Second, he charged that the test is “notoriously unhelpful” in 
identifying what government conduct constitutes a search.
62
 Third, he labeled 
the test “self-indulgent” because it allows judges, and especially the Justices, 
to decide what privacy expectations are “reasonable.”63  
Speaking for the majority in Kyllo, Justice Scalia acknowledged his prior 
criticism of the Katz test. The Kyllo majority observed, “The Katz test . . . has 
often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.”64 
The majority cited, among other published criticism, Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Carter.
65
 Of course, the Kyllo majority’s acknowledgment of 
the criticism is not the same as endorsement of it. Immediately after this 
acknowledgment, however, the majority admitted, “[I]t may be difficult to 
refine Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, 
or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of residences are [sic] at issue 
. . . .”66 Thus, far from refuting the criticism of Katz, the majority at least 
weakly endorsed it outside the context of the case before it. 
More importantly, the Kyllo majority did not apply the Katz test to the 
case before it. Under the Katz test, the sole inquiry should have been whether 
Kyllo reasonably expected the relative warmth of his roof and a side of his 
house to remain private.
67
 The reasonableness of any such expectation 
                                                                                                                         
 
the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.”).  
 58. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042.  
 59. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1961) (holding that government’s 
electronic eavesdropping constituted a search because it involved “unauthorized physical penetration 
into the premises”; finding it unnecessary to determine “whether or not there was a technical trespass 
under the local property rules relating to party walls”).  
 60. 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 61. Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 62. Id. See also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729-30 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (criticizing majority’s approach to determining whether government employees have 
reasonable expectations of privacy in their offices because majority’s ad hoc, “case-by-case” approach 
created difficulties for lower courts, the police, and citizens).  
 63. Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 64. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.  
 65. See id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990) (criticizing lower court for using 
multi-factor test to determine whether defendant could claim Fourth Amendment protection; sole 
factor was whether he reasonably expected privacy in place searched); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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depended partly on whether thermal imagers were in general public use in 
1992, when Kyllo’s house was scanned.68 The Kyllo majority mentioned this 
factor but did not treat it as essential to the analysis.
69
 To the contrary, the 
majority said that whether a type of surveillance technology is in general 
public use only “may be a factor.”70 Furthermore, the majority implied that it 
mentioned the factor only because it was forced to do so by precedent.
71
 
More fundamentally, the majority could not have meant its ruling to last only 
until thermal imagers come into general use. Such a ruling would hardly 
serve the majority’s objective of “tak[ing] the long view” by deciding the 
case in a way that would “assure” preservation of that degree of privacy 
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.”72 
I believe that the Kyllo majority avoided the Katz test to avoid the 
problem that is so well illustrated by its application to the facts of Kyllo. The 
problem with the Katz test, as the Kyllo majority recognized, is that the test is 
“circular.”73 Under the test, the less privacy we have—because of technology 
such as thermal imaging, for example—the less we can reasonably expect. 
As our reasonable expectations of privacy decrease, the types of government 
intrusions that will be found to fall outside of the Fourth Amendment (as not 
constituting searches) increases. Thus, when courts apply the Katz test in this 
“reverse” mode—i.e., to conclude that government conduct is not a search 
for Fourth Amendment purposes—the test is not just circular; it causes a 
                                                                                                                         
 
207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 68. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-214 (emphasizing that government aerial observation of 
defendant took place from publicly navigable airspace).  
 69. See id. at 2046 n.6 (internal cross-reference omitted). 
The dissent argues that we have injected potential uncertainty into the constitutional analysis by 
noting that whether or not the technology is in general public use may be a factor . . . . That 
quarrel, however, is not with us but with this Court’s precedent. See [California v.] Ciraolo, [476 
U.S. 207, 215 (1986)] (‘In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is 
routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally 
protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1000 feet’). Given that we 
can quite confidently say that thermal imaging is not “routine,” we decline in this case to 
reexamine that factor. 
Id. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added).  
 71. See id. (stating that dissent’s criticism of majority’s reliance on “general public use” factor is 
a quarrel “not with us but with this Court’s precedent”).  
 72. Id. at 2043. See also id. at 2050 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that “general public use” 
factor is “somewhat perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than 
recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”).  
 73. Id. at 2043. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“[I]t would, of course, be 
merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate 
depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases.”).  
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downward spiral in Fourth Amendment protection.
74
  
The reverse Katz test undermines the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee against unreasonable searches, as Justice Scalia has described that 
purpose. Speaking only for himself in Minnesota v. Dickerson, Justice Scalia 
said: “The purpose of the provision . . . is to preserve that degree of respect 
for the privacy of persons . . . that existed when the provision was adopted—
even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all 
sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”75 The first part of the statement in Dickerson 
is echoed in Justice Scalia’s expression, in the Kyllo majority opinion, of a 
desire to “assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”76 The second part of 
his statement in Dickerson, concerning our “less virtuous age,” presages the 
Kyllo majority’s concern with the “power of technology to shrink the realm 
of guaranteed privacy.”77  
In short, Kyllo recognizes the problem with the reverse Katz test that 
Justice Scalia previously had identified and avoids the test to avoid 
undermining what Justice Scalia previously had identified as the purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches. Justice 
Scalia had identified the problem with reverse Katz and the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment in opinions in which he spoke for less than a majority, 
and sometimes only for himself. In Kyllo, in contrast, he spoke for the 
majority. In this respect, Kyllo reflects an ascendance of Justice Scalia’s view 
of the Fourth Amendment.  
2. The Extent to Which Kyllo Does Not Endorse Justice Scalia’s View 
of the Fourth Amendment 
The ascendance described above is only partial. While the Kyllo majority 
departed from the reverse Katz test, the majority did not adopt Justice 
Scalia’s approach to identifying a Fourth Amendment “search.” Nor does 
Kyllo signal a rejection of “positive” uses of the Katz test. 
Justice Scalia’s approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation relies on its 
text as it was originally understood. He said in Dickerson that the words of 
 
 
 74. See id. at 2042 (explaining that, although the Court in Katz concluded that electronic 
eavesdropping of a conversation in telephone booth constituted a search, the Court in later cases used 
Katz “somewhat in reverse” to conclude that certain government actions did not constitute a search).  
 75. 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 76. 121 S. Ct. at 2043. See also id. at 2046 (“The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the 
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted . . . .”) (quoting 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).  
 77. Id. at 2043.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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the Fourth Amendment “must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the 
time of their ratification.”78 Thus, to determine whether government conduct 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search,” Justice Scalia would rely 
primarily on the original understanding of the word “search.”79 Justice Scalia 
might also treat as a “search” conduct that is substantially equivalent to 
conduct traditionally understood as a search.
80
  
The Kyllo majority did not entirely follow Justice Scalia’s approach. 
Rather, the majority used an amalgam of Justice Scalia’s approach and the 
Katz test. The majority adopted a “criterion” that, consistent with Katz, 
reflects the current expectations of privacy—“the minimal expectation of 
privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”81 Yet the 
majority also claims that this criterion had “roots deep in the common law” 
and would “assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”82 It 
might make sense to link modern privacy expectations to framing-era privacy 
expectations if there were not much difference between them. There is 
obviously a big difference, however, and the majority knew it.
83
 
In leavening Justice Scalia’s approach with the Katz test, Kyllo may show 
concern by some Justices in the Kyllo majority that Justice Scalia’s approach 
does not always protect privacy better than the Katz test. In his concurrence 
in Carter, for example, Justice Scalia used his original-understanding 
approach to conclude that temporary visitors to a home could not challenge a 
search of the home that occurred during their visit.
84
 Despite that conclusion, 
five Justices in Carter relied on the Katz test to conclude that a temporary 
social visitor usually can contest such searches.
85
 Among those five were two 
 
 
 78. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 379 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 79. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042 & n.1 (observing that visual observation of the outside of a 
house would be a “search” as that term was originally understood). Cf. California v. Hodari D., 499 
U.S. 621, 624-27 (1991) (in opinion for majority by Scalia, J., construing the term “seizure” in the 
Fourth Amendment based on original understanding of that term).  
 80. Cf. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (stating that judgment of reasonableness of a search might be 
affected by technological developments post-dating adoption of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment).  
 81. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.  
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology . . . .”) See also 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1764 (2001) (recognizing privacy interests implicated by 
electronic eavesdropping but striking down provision in federal wire-tap statute that criminalized 
disclosure of illegally intercepted communication on ground that, as applied to case before it, 
provision violated First Amendment).  
 84. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Respondents here were not searched in 
‘their . . . hous[e]’ under any interpretation of the phrase that bears the remotest relationship to the 
well-understood meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 85. See id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[M]y view [is] that almost all social guests have a 
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Members who joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Kyllo—
Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
86
 
Kyllo thus avoided using the reverse Katz test because its use would have 
undermined the privacy traditionally expected in the home. Accordingly, 
Kyllo does not signal that the Court would repudiate a “positive” use of the 
Katz test—as occurred in Katz itself—to extend Fourth Amendment 
protection beyond that afforded under a common-law approach to defining a 
“search.” Even so, this limited departure from the “settled rule” of Katz87—
occurring as it did in “the prototypical and hence most common litigated area 
of protected privacy,” a search involving the interior of a home88—represents 
a significant change in Fourth Amendment law. Justice Scalia is chiefly 
responsible for that change. 
B. Kyllo and the Warrant Requirement 
1. Kyllo’s Reinforcement of a Narrow Warrant Presumption 
Kyllo not only avoided the reverse Katz test, but also suggested that the 
test was developed “to preserve somewhat more intact [the Court’s] doctrine 
that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.”89 In the last 
decade, the Court has abandoned the broad principle that all warrantless 
searches are presumptively unconstitutional.
90
 Justice Scalia has played a 
major role in that trend.
91
 Kyllo reinforces that trend by departing from the 
reverse Katz test, thereby discouraging its use to shore up a broad warrant 
presumption, and by articulating a narrow version of the presumption. 
Until about 1990, the Court often said that all warrantless searches were 
presumptively unconstitutional, even while the Court recognized many 
situations in which the presumption was overcome.
92
 A classic statement of 
                                                                                                                         
 
legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host’s 
home.”); id. at 109 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I think it noteworthy that five Members of the Court 
would place under the Fourth Amendment’s shield, at least, ‘almost all social guests . . . .’”) (quoting 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Carter).  
 86. See id. at 106.  
 87. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The settled rule is that the requisite connection is an 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”).  
 88. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.  
 89. Id. at 2042.  
 90. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.  
 91. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.  
 92. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (referring to the “requirement that 
searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an independent judicial officer”); United States 
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984) (“Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable though the 
Court has recognized a few limited exceptions to this general rule.”); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 585 (1979) (“Unreasonable searches or seizures conducted without any warrant at all are 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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the presumption comes from Katz, in which the Court said: “[S]earches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”93 The 
Court quoted that statement in many later opinions.
94
 At the same time, the 
Court expanded the number and scope of what had begun as “a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”95 
Justice Scalia called the Court on this inconsistency in his concurring 
opinion in California v. Acevedo.
96
 In that opinion, he contended that the 
Court had “lurched back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant 
requirement and looking to reasonableness alone.”97 Because of the Court’s 
erratic path, he charged, “the ‘warrant requirement’ had become so riddled 
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.”98  
Justice Scalia’s criticism apparently hit home. The majority’s 1991 
opinion in Acevedo appears to be the last one stating the warrant presumption 
in the broad form that he criticized.
99
 In the last ten years, the broad version 
of this presumption seems to appear only in dissents.
100
 Apparently thanks to 
Justice Scalia’s criticism in Acevedo, the broad version of the presumption 
seems to have died from embarrassment. 
                                                                                                                         
 
condemned by the plain language of the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment.”); Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164 (1978) (“The bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection, of course, is the 
Warrant Clause, requiring that, absent certain exceptions, police obtain a warrant from a neutral and 
disinterested magistrate before embarking upon a search.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 
427 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (“There is no more basic constitutional rule in the Fourth 
Amendment area than that which makes a warrantless search unreasonable except in a few ‘jealously 
and carefully drawn’ exceptional circumstances.”) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 
(1958)).  
 93. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  
 94. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 
17, 19-20 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 390 (1978); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1980). See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 
559, 568-69 & n.2 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing precedent from 1972 and earlier supporting 
“our longstanding warrant presumption”).  
 95. 389 U.S. 347, 357. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or 
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1752 (1994) (noting the 
abundance of academic commentary criticizing Court for “riddling” the Warrant Clause with 
exceptions).  
 96. 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Prior to criticizing the 
broad warrant presumption in Acevedo, Justice Scalia had himself articulated it, without criticism, in 
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “as a general rule 
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable”) (emphasis in original). Perhaps this prior acquiescence 
reflected that Ortega was one of the earliest Fourth Amendment cases in which Justice Scalia 
participated after joining the Court.  
 97. 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 580.  
 100. See, e.g., White, 526 U.S. at 567 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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In Acevedo, Justice Scalia not only criticized the broad warrant 
presumption, but also blamed it for the reverse Katz test. He said, “Our 
intricate body of law regarding ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ has been 
developed largely as a means of creating these [warrant] exceptions, enabling 
a search to be denominated not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ and therefore 
not subject to the general warrant requirement.”101 Justice Scalia repeated this 
view, speaking for the majority in Kyllo, when he suggested that the Court 
had applied the Katz test “somewhat in reverse,” “perhaps in order to 
preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are 
presumptively unconstitutional.”102 In Justice Scalia’s view, the reverse Katz 
test enabled the Court to uphold warrantless government investigative 
methods without having to recognize new warrant exceptions that would 
destroy the illusion of a broad warrant presumption.
103
  
If this view is correct, Kyllo should help prevent a resuscitation of the 
broad warrant presumption. As discussed in the last section, Kyllo avoided 
the reverse Katz test. By doing so, it furnishes precedent discouraging a use 
of that test to shore up the illusion that a broad warrant presumption exists. 
To put it in Machiavellian terms, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority in 
Kyllo prevents the Court from using the reverse Katz test as an “out” (i.e., as 
a way to uphold warrantless government surveillance methods of which the 
Court approves without recognizing new warrant exceptions in order to 
uphold them). 
Justice Scalia also participated in articulating a new, narrow version of the 
presumption in his opinion for the majority in Vernonia School District 47J 
v. Acton.
104
 In upholding warrantless drug testing of public school athletes, 
Justice Scalia wrote for the Vernonia Court: “Where a search is undertaken 
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, 
this Court has said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a 
judicial warrant.”105 He emphasized, however, that “a warrant is not required 
to establish the reasonableness of all government searches.”106 Vernonia 
almost creates a reverse warrant presumption; the Fourth Amendment 
generally does not require a search warrant except for searches conducted by 
law-enforcement officials for evidence of crime. 
Since Vernonia, the Court has usually invoked the warrant presumption 
 
 
 101. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 102. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2042.  
 103. See id. at 2042-43.  
 104. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  
 105. Id. at 653 (citations omitted).  
 106. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/1
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only in cases involving searches of the home, as it did in Kyllo, in which the 
Court said that searches of homes are “presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”107 Such statements do not deny the existence of the presumption in 
all other settings. For example, the Court presumably would continue to 
apply at least a weak warrant presumption to government searches of 
ordinary businesses for evidence of crime.
108
 Nonetheless, Kyllo suggests 
that the current Court applies the warrant presumption especially vigorously 
to searches of the home, which the Court considers “the prototypical . . . area 
of protected privacy.”109 In this respect, Kyllo may also signal a balkanization 
of the Fourth Amendment.
110
 
In short, when Kyllo is examined closely and in the context of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, it is an important case not only because it departs from the 
reverse Katz test, but also because it reinforces the narrowing of the once 
broad warrant presumption in two ways. First, by departing from the reverse 
Katz test, Kyllo may block future resort to that test as a means of shoring up 
the illusion of a broad warrant presumption. Second, Kyllo articulates the 
new, narrow version of the presumption, under which the warrant 
requirement applies most stringently to searches of the home. 
2. The Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia’s View on When 
Reasonableness Requires a Warrant 
Kyllo shows that a majority of the Court shares Justice Scalia’s solicitude 
for the home and his resulting insistence that warrants are usually required 
for the government to search homes. Read together with other precedent, 
Kyllo also suggests that a majority of the Court would apply the warrant 
presumption less strongly, or not at all, in other settings. Kyllo does not, 
however, signal majority support for Justice Scalia’s approach to determining 
when the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant. Kyllo thus reflects only a 
partial ascendance of Justice Scalia’s view of the warrant requirement. 
Just as Justice Scalia would rely primarily on original understanding to 
 
 
 107. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2046. See also id. at 2042 (“With few exceptions, the question whether a 
warrantless search of a home is reasonable must be answered no.”).  
 108. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 325 (1978) (holding that statute 
authorizing warrantless searches of ordinary businesses violated Fourth Amendment; stating that the 
“rule” that “warrantless searches are generally unreasonable . . . applies to commercial premises as 
well as homes”).  
 109. Id. at 2043. Cf. White, 526 U.S. at 565 (“[A] warrant resumptively is required for a felony 
arrest in a suspect’s home.”).  
 110. See id. at 2051 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s rule as too narrow because “a 
rule that is designed to protect individuals from the overly intrusive use of sense-enhancing equipment 
should not be limited to a home”).  
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identify “searches” subject to the Fourth Amendment, he would consult the 
common-law extant when the Fourth Amendment was adopted to determine 
whether a search without a warrant is “unreasonable” under the 
Amendment.
111
 For him, in other words, the common law establishes a 
strong presumption of whether or not a warrant is required in the situation 
under analysis. He has also suggested, however, that this presumption can be 
overcome. In Acevedo, he said that “changes in the surrounding legal rules 
(for example, elimination of the common-law rule that reasonable, good-faith 
belief was no defense to absolute liability for [a government official’s] 
trespass) may make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once 
was not.”112 In addition to suggesting that warrants may be required today in 
situations where they were not required at common law, Justice Scalia has 
suggested the converse is also true. In Dickerson, he said that technological 
changes may justify dispensing with any common-law tradition that would 
have required a warrant for a pat down search of the sort authorized in Terry 
v. Ohio.
113
 Thus, Justice Scalia might allow specific legal or factual changes 
to overcome the common-law presumption; however, he would not allow it 
to be overcome by more generalized changes in society’s notions of 
reasonableness.
114
 
Justice Scalia’s common-law approach to determining reasonableness—
including the determination of when reasonableness requires a warrant—
produces a Fourth Amendment that is tall but narrow compared to the Fourth 
Amendment that has been produced by the combination of a broad warrant 
presumption and the Katz test.
115
 In Arizona v. Hicks, for example, Justice 
Scalia would not tolerate even minor warrantless searches of a home unless 
they fell within a traditional exception, such as the exception for exigent 
 
 
 111. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing “the first principle that the 
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law 
afforded”); id. (“I have no difficulty with the proposition that [Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
Clause] includes the requirement of a warrant, where the common law required a warrant . . . .”).  
 112. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).  
 113. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 382 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[E]ven if a ‘frisk’ prior to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791 
[when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted], . . . perhaps it is only since that time that concealed 
weapons capable of harming the interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach have become 
common—which might alter the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard.”).  
 114. See id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that interpretation of Fourth Amendment should 
not change merely because “a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all 
sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable’”). But cf. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 687 (referring to the “coarsening of our 
national manners that ultimately gives the Fourth Amendment its content”).  
 115. For the insight that Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment is “tall but narrow,” I thank William 
C. Bryson, former Deputy Solicitor General and current Judge of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.  
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circumstances.
116
 In Minnesota v. Carter, on the other hand, Justice Scalia 
refused to extend Fourth Amendment protection to a social visitor to a home 
because the common law did not do so.
117
 Justice Scalia takes a similarly 
“tall but narrow” approach to searches of persons. In Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, Justice Scalia doubted the constitutionality of Terry frisks without 
common-law evidence of their validity.
118
 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
however, Justice Scalia distinguished the government’s collection of urine 
samples from the plaintiffs—which he thought “could conceivably be 
regarded as a search” of their persons—from the government’s testing of 
those samples, which he did not think could “realistically” be treated as a 
search of the plaintiffs’ “effects” as that term was originally understood.119  
A majority of the Court, unlike Justice Scalia, does not seem ready to 
follow the common law wherever it goes.
120
 Justice Scalia wrote for the 
majority in only one of the four cases cited in the last paragraph—Hicks.121 
In the three other cases cited, Carter, Dickerson, and Ferguson, Justice 
Scalia wrote for less than a majority.
122
 Under pressure from Justice Scalia, 
and consistent with precedent, the Court will no doubt consider the original 
 
 
 116. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding, in opinion written for majority by 
Scalia, J., that warrantless, cursory inspection of the bottom of stereo equipment violated Fourth 
Amendment; and stating: “A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of 
a turntable”).  
 117. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 92-97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that, as originally 
understood, Fourth Amendment’s protection of people in “their . . . houses” protected people only in 
their respective houses, not in other people’s houses) (emphasis in original).  
 118. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (considering absence of common-
law evidence supporting the permissibility of Terry frisks). See also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680-81 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (observing that Court had in prior cases upheld 
warrantless bodily searches of individuals in the absence of individualized suspicion only for prison 
inmates and dissenting from decision upholding warrantless urine testing of certain railroad 
employees).  
 119. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1296 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302-03 (1999) (holding, in opinion written for the Court by 
Justice Scalia, that warrantless search of passenger’s purse found in car did not violate Fourth 
Amendment, given historical evidence supporting the practice, while distinguishing “body searches,” 
which implicate “the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s 
person”).  
 120. But cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1543-53 (2001) (holding, in opinion 
written for majority by Justice Souter, that Fourth Amendment did not prohibit warrantless arrest for 
minor criminal offenses, considering common-law tradition permitting such arrests).  
 121. In Hicks, as in Kyllo, Justice Scalia was in unusual company. The majority for which he 
wrote in Hicks included Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens; the dissent 
consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy. See Hicks, 480 
U.S. at 322 (reporting voting alignment).  
 122. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 
379 (Scalia, J., concurring alone); Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1296 (Scalia, J., dissenting alone with 
respect to part of dissenting opinion analyzing search of plaintiffs’ “persons” and “effects”).  
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understanding of the Fourth Amendment in interpreting it.
123
 The majority 
does not seemed prepared, however, to give original understanding as much 
weight as Justice Scalia would give it.
124
  
Kyllo indicates that this situation continues. The Kyllo majority purported 
to decide the case using a criterion with “roots deep in the common law.”125 
It also quoted Carroll v. United States,
126
 as Justice Scalia did in his 
Dickerson concurrence,
127
 for the proposition that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
is to be construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and 
seizure when it was adopted.”128 The Kyllo majority, however, also included 
words from the Carroll opinion that were omitted from Justice Scalia’s 
Dickerson concurrence and that require the Fourth Amendment to be 
construed, not only in light of its original understanding, but also “in a 
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights 
of individual citizens.”129 Consistently with these additional words from 
Carroll, the Kyllo Court considered the expectation of privacy “that exists, 
and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.”130  
The Court in Kyllo claimed that it took “the long view, from the original 
 
 
 123. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (“The Fourth Amendment is to 
be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted 
. . . .”). See also, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion) (stating that Fourth Amendment 
analysis includes consideration of, among other things, “the intention of the Framers”).  
 124. Of particular importance, if one is counting votes, Justice Scalia has not persuaded Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy, who often provide the “swing votes” in close cases, that his common-law 
approach should always control Fourth Amendment questions. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 100 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring separately from Justice Scalia’s concurrence) (arguing that common-law tradition of 
home privacy “has acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying a more 
general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an assurance which has become part of our 
constitutional tradition”); Hicks, 480 U.S. at 337-39 (O’Connor, J., dissenting from majority opinion 
written by Justice Scalia) (using a balancing approach to analyze validity of police’s warrantless, 
cursory inspection of item suspected to be stolen). See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 579-80 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in case in which 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority) (expressing reservations about majority’s broad rejection of 
plaintiffs’ “nexus theory” of standing and, unlike majority, recognizing congressional power to 
“articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before”); 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment in case in which Justice Scalia wrote for majority) (stating, in apparent disagreement with 
majority, that “[t]he common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory 
power in a complex and interdependent society”). See generally Marcia Coyle, Whose Court Is It, 
Anyway?, NAT’L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A1 (discussing significance of Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy in close cases).  
 125. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.  
 126. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).  
 127. 508 U.S. at 379-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 128. See 121 S. Ct. at 2046 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149).  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.”131 This is not just rhetoric; it 
accurately describes the amalgam of common law and modern privacy 
concerns that produced the result in Kyllo. The Court’s reasoning is an 
amalgam, however, rather than a synthesis. The “neither fish nor fowl” 
quality reflects that the ascendance of Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment is 
not yet complete. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is written at the beginning of the twenty-first Century and in 
the opening days of what the President of the United States has called the 
“first war” of the new century.132 This is a precarious point from which to 
make predictions. One must avoid overestimating the importance of events 
that may seem momentous only because of their timing. On the other hand, 
one must avoid underestimating the importance of events that would fall into 
insignificance, but for their timing. 
To avoid these dangers, it is important to recognize that, at the very least, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States has much more 
importance than first meets the eye. On its surface, the case merely presents 
the age-old problem of applying settled legal principles in a new context. 
Consistent with that appearance, the Court purports to resolve the case by 
“refin[ing]”133 the well-established Katz test and reaching a result that is 
plausible under the precedent developing that test. Beneath the surface of 
Kyllo, however, one can see important changes in the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment analysis, including a departure from the thirty-five-year-old 
Katz test and a reinforcement of a newly narrow warrant presumption.  
Although we cannot clearly envision the Fourth Amendment that these 
changes will produce, it is safe to say that this future Fourth Amendment will 
differ significantly from the one that Justice Scalia found on joining the 
Court, and that he will deserve much of the credit (or blame) for those 
differences. Perhaps, regardless of our individual fears or hopes about these 
changes, we can all take comfort in recognizing that a single person still has 
the power to bring them about. 
 
 
 
 
 131. Id. at 2046.  
 132. David Von Drehle, Reagan National Closed for Now: Other Airports Open, on Edge, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1.  
 133. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.  
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